

# Puerto Rico Housing and Community Development Industry's Capacity for Disaster Recovery

EDWIN MELÉNDEZ

## ABSTRACT

My main goal with this case study of disaster policy implementation is to provide an assessment of the capacity of the nonprofit sector to become an active participant in the long-term economic recovery of Puerto Rico. And, more generally, I wish to examine barriers hindering nonprofit sector participation. The study is intended to take advantage of this window of opportunity to strengthen the housing and community development industry in the island. In the first section of the study I discuss the relative size and strength of the housing and community development industry in the context of the nonprofit sector in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico has robust nonprofit and cooperatives sector but a smaller housing and community development sub-sector. In the second part of the study, I identified three significant barriers that have hindered the development of the housing community development industry in Puerto Rico: the exclusionary role of federal and local recovery funding policy; the relative weakness of the industry ecosystem; and, the relative scarcity of professionals with the understanding of reconstruction programs. The final section of the study presents conclusions, and policy and industry development strategies recommendations. I conclude that post-disaster federal funding for economic recovery offers Puerto Rico a unique window of opportunity to restore its economy and infrastructure in a more resilient fashion while strengthening the nonprofit sector capacity for community planning, housing and economic development, and neighborhood revitalization. However, such an opportunity is contingent on reforming public policy and implementing a comprehensive strategy to encourage and support nonprofit developers' participation in reconstruction programs, as well as building industry capacity by strengthening intermediaries and community development corporations, encouraging intra-industry partnerships and collaborations, and providing professional development for economic recovery. [Key words: Puerto Rico, housing, community development, nonprofit, economy recovery]

## Introduction

Post-disaster planning and federal funding for economic recovery offer Puerto Rico a unique window of opportunity to restore its economy and infrastructure in a more resilient fashion. However, such an opportunity hinges on the capacity of the civic sector to join government efforts in planning and then executing a comprehensive reconstruction and recovery program. Many local and stateside foundations and other philanthropic efforts spearheaded initiatives in the aftermath of Hurricanes Irma and Maria to strengthen the nonprofit sector to serve the needs of the storms' victims, an effort that was renewed after the earthquakes damaged the island at the end of 2019. The Foundation Center estimates that these philanthropic efforts raised more than \$375 million for relief and recovery from the storms, a substantial sixty-fold increase from prior years (Red de Fundaciones de Puerto Rico 2019). Yet these unprecedented philanthropic efforts pale in comparison to the federal funding assigned to the island in various recovery programs. My main goal with this mixed-methods case study of disaster policy implementation is to provide an assessment of the capacity of the nonprofit sector to become an active participant in the long-term economic recovery of Puerto Rico and, more generally, to take advantage of this window of opportunity to strengthen the housing and community development industry in Puerto Rico.

Shortly after the two 2017 storms, the government of Puerto Rico published two reports that jointly provide a framework for post-disaster planning for economic recovery for Puerto Rico: *Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico* (Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency 2018),<sup>1</sup> and *Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Action Plan* (Puerto Rico Department of Housing 2018). Jointly, these two plans detail the estimated damages caused by Hurricanes Irma and Maria and offer an allocation plan for funding

---

The author (emele@hunter.cuny.edu) is a Professor of Urban Policy and Planning and the Director of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College, CUNY. In addition to numerous scientific papers and other publications, he is the author or editor of thirteen books including *State of Puerto Ricans* (Centro Press, 2017) and *Puerto Ricans at the Dawn of the New Millennium* (Centro Press, 2014), and served as guest editor of *CENTRO Journal's* "Pathway to Economic Opportunity" (v.23 n.2, 2011) and "Puerto Rico Post-Hurricane Maria: Origins and Consequences of a Crisis" (v.30 n.3, 2018) issues.

and other resources received, assigned, or expected from the federal government for a total, estimated immediately after the storm, of \$94 billion over the next decade (Rosselló 2017). In February 2020, the total disaster recovery funding appropriations to Puerto Rico were \$44.5 billion.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the economic devastation of the 2017 storms, initial earthquake damages were assessed at about \$3.1 billion (Center on Disaster Philanthropy 2020). Moreover, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated Puerto Rico's ongoing fiscal and financial crisis, rooted in an unpayable public debt of over \$120 billion.

Following Smith and Wenger (2007, 237), I define disaster recovery as “the differential process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural environment through pre-event planning and post-event actions.” The unique role of the nonprofit sector in disaster recovery and preparedness, by fostering community engagement and increased levels of disaster resilience and sustainable recovery, is well-established in the literature (Dyer 1999; Mileti 1999; Smith and Birkland 2012; Peacock, Morrow and Gladwin 1997; Scott and Murphy 2014; Welsh and Esnard 2009). Community engagement is defined along three dimensions: (a) decision-making, (b) relationship development, and (c) capacity-building (Butteriss 2020). The last five decades of studies on civic engagement in post-disaster scenarios have shown the importance of adequate community preparedness and how resilience to disasters requires enhancing existing social systems and structures to promote information flow and collaboration. Community preparedness requires increasing capacity and empowering local governments and communities to implement recovery actions and to foster coordination and collaboration across sectors and between federal and local governments (Johnson and Olshansky 2017; May and Williams 1985; McDonnell et al. 2019; Meyer and Hendricks 2018; Warren et al. 2015).

In short, federal policy and spending on community engagement processes and nonprofit sector participation, used to determine overall community recovery has been well established in the disaster recovery literature. Yet, as Garcia and Chandrasekhar (2020) found in a survey of nonprofit participation in Puerto Rico's reclamation, the nonprofit sector had a wide participation in the immediate emergency phase of the post-disaster recovery, a change primarily supported by private donations but with minimal support from the lo-

cal or federal government. The nonprofit sector capacity to participate in the post-disaster economic recovery phase is constrained due to several factors. These factors are related to the various stages and capacity requirements for program participation, such as community planning for project development, competing for local and federal funding, and management and compliance of programs. There is limited experience in the nonprofit sector with federal housing and economic development and disaster mitigation programs, which constitute the focus of the post-disaster economic recovery phase. As Borges-Méndez (2020) has observed, even organizations with prior knowledge in community economic development have a limited capacity for real estate development, find it difficult to meet the NOFA requirements and be competitive for federal funding, and a significant barrier for the nonprofit sector participation in economic recovery is the lack of predevelopment funds.

It is not certain whether the nonprofit sector can become an active participant in the long-term economic recovery of Puerto Rico, nor do we know the barriers hindering or factors advancing such development. To answer these questions, I used a mixed method case study approach, which combined statistical data from various sources and reviewed public sector and other documents. In addition, I incorporate the findings from six major conferences and symposia, conducted by the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, on the impact of the hurricanes on the island and its reconstruction, and the technical and operational needs of non-profit organizations for participating in disaster recovery planning and program participation. The overall conclusion of the study is that whether the nonprofit sector can become an active participant in the long-term economic recovery of Puerto Rico is contingent on the implementation of a comprehensive strategy for reforming public policy to encourage and support nonprofit developers participation in reconstruction programs, building industry capacity by strengthening intermediaries and Community Development Corporations (CDCs), encouraging intra-industry partnerships and collaborations, and providing professional development for economic recovery.

In the first section of the study, I briefly explain the evolution of housing and community development in Puerto Rico and the historical policies and other factors that benefit or constrain the development of the industry. Federal policies are at the center of the evolution of the housing industry in Puerto Rico. When local and federal policy were combined to support local

developers, as was the case when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 was enacted, nonprofit developers surpassed private sector units of housing through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LI-HTC) program during the four years of ARRA funding.

In the second part of the study I identify three significant barriers to the development of housing and community development industry in Puerto Rico: the exclusionary role of federal and local recovery funding policy; the relative weakness of the industry ecosystem; and, the relative scarcity of professionals with economic development skills, especially professionals with the understanding of reconstruction programs. These barriers are associated with the relatively small number of CDCs in Puerto Rico and nonprofit sector capacity to participate effectively in federal economic recovery programs. I also report on the findings of a survey for the assessment of professional skills for the implementation of post-disaster planning for economic recovery for Puerto Rico. The results of the survey indicate a need for programs that offer systematic development of skills associated with the implementation of post-disaster planning for economic recovery for Puerto Rico.

The final section of the study is composed of conclusions, and recommendations for policy reform and industry development strategies. These recommendations include: the need to reform federal recovery funding policy to be more inclusive of nonprofit developers; development of a low cost, high risk predevelopment fund and promoting intra-industry partnerships to support CDCs; development of professional training for post-disaster economic recovery, possibly as continuing education targeting the nonprofit and municipal sectors; strengthening community development intermediaries to serve as financial intermediaries and as providers of technical assistance; and, improving access to interactive GIS maps for community planning visualizations and to provide empirical evidence for strategic planning and project development.

### **A Brief History of Housing and Community Development in Puerto Rico**

The origins of Puerto Rico's housing and community development industry and its connection to federal policy can be traced back to the extension to Puerto Rico of the U.S. Housing Act (1937) and the federal mortgage program through the Federal Housing Administration (1938), or FHA. In response to this legislation, the local government created a public authority to

manage the implementation of these programs—the Autoridad de Hogares de Puerto Rico (1938). These programs were instrumental for the financing of new homeowners, and public and subsidized rental housing. In addition, the Legislature of Puerto Rico passed Law 26 (1941) for the creation of the Land Authority of Puerto Rico. This law distributed land to rural workers and launched a massive community planning effort that “developed more than 610 *parcela* communities, containing more than 185,000, in the 50-year period from 1941 to 1992” when “more than 35,000 houses were built under the Self-help and Mutual Aid Program” (Fuller-Marvel 2008).

---

*In urban areas, the spread of squatters and informal housing became a significant problem in the early postwar years as workers transition from a declining agricultural production to manufacturing, government agencies and public enterprises, and service industries.*

---

The post-war transition to labor-intensive manufacturing spearheaded under the Popular Democratic Party's Operation Bootstrap required and went in tandem to the expansion of urban development. In urban areas, the spread of squatters and informal housing became a significant problem in the early postwar years as workers transition from a declining agricultural production to manufacturing, government agencies and public enterprises, and service industries. Several federal legislations supported urban sprawl in Puerto Rico. The Serviceman's Readjustment Act (1944), also known as the GI Bill, fueled the expansion of urban housing developments, known as *urbanizaciones*, in Puerto Rico by providing veterans access to mortgage loans at reasonable terms guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA) or by the federally backed home mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. By the same token, the Housing Act (1954) supported the expansion of public housing and homeownership through mortgage lending backed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Following these federal programs, the Puerto Rico government created the Urban and Housing Renewal Administration (Administración de Renovación Urbana y Vivienda, 1958) and the Urban and Housing Development Administration (Corporación de Renovación Urbana y Vivienda CRUV, 1963) (Alameda-Lozada 2005).

The early postwar rural and urban housing programs succeeded in eradicating slums and the most extreme forms of substandard housing. But, by the late 1960s and through the '70s, the squatters movement intensified and the lack of affordable housing in Puerto Rico was evident (Cotto 1993). In the United States, President Johnson's War on Poverty programs targeted housing segregation and discrimination and were seeking new models for urban renewal targeting areas with high concentration of the poor. With the support of the Ford Foundation, the community development corporation (CDC) became the model for urban redevelopment (Sviridoff 2004). In unison with the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, which provided mechanism to channel federal funding to nonprofit organizations, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was created as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 specifically to incentivize private equity investment in affordable housing. The LIHTC has played a critical role in the development of affordable housing in the United States since its creation and has set the foundations for an increasing role for both the nonprofit and private sectors' participation in the housing and community development. In conjunction, the CRA's guidelines to encourage banks and other financial institutions to reinvest in low income communities, in which they are chartered to do business. The LIHTC provided the incentives and mechanisms for the present housing and community development industry to operate as an interdependent alliance of the private and nonprofit sector. Their joint efforts to date shape federal and local public policy for the industry.

Table 1 depicts the progression of the most important HUD-subsidized housing programs in Puerto Rico from 2000 to 2019. By far, public housing programs offer the largest number of subsidized units in the island, with 53,079 units in 2019. This number represents a small decline in the share of total units--from 65 percent in 2000 to 57 percent in 2019. The LIHTC is the second largest HUD-subsidized program, with 20,536 units or 22 percent of total units. This program also declined slightly from its peak in 2010 of 24,210 units or 23 percent of total units. Overall, the total number of HUD-subsidized units in Puerto Rico declined by ten thousand units, from 103,442 units in 2010 to 93,466 units. Section 8, the other significant HUD program, was the only program with a slight increase in its share of

**Table 1.** Total Units of HUD-Subsidized Rental Housing in Puerto Rico by Programs (2000, 2010, 2019)

Program	2000		2010		2019	
LIHTC	6,920	7.9%	24,210	23.4%	20,536	22.0%
Public Housing	56,888	64.9%	55,871	54.0%	53,079	56.8%
Section 8 NC/SR (a)	17,055	19.5%	15,466	15.0%	18,713	20.0%
Multi-Family/Other	6,746	7.7%	7,895	7.6%	1,138	1.2%
Total	87,609	100.0%	103,442	100.0%	93,466	100.0%

Source: HUD User Datasets. <[https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdrdatas\\_landing.html#dataset-title/](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdrdatas_landing.html#dataset-title/)>.

Notes: (a) Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation Program (S8 NC/SR).

units increasing from 15,466 units (15 percent of total) in 2010 to 18,713 (20 percent of total) in 2019.

In Puerto Rico the role and participation of CDCs in affordable housing and community development has been erratic, with tax credits largely favoring private over nonprofit developers. According to Ramos Bermúdez (2003), by 2002 there were eight established nonprofit Community Housing Development Organizations (CHDOs) in Puerto Rico. As depicted in Table 2, most of these organizations were incorporated in the mid-1990s. By 2002, CHDOs had built 28 projects for a total of 1,675 housing units. Most of these units (1,227) were for home ownership, and about one-fourth of the total (435) were affordable rental housing units. With 676 completed units, the Corporación para Desarrollo de Viviendas de Toa Baja, incorporated as a nonprofit development subsidiary of the municipality, built the largest share of units. The HOME program was the most significant federal program financing nonprofit organizations housing construction in the 1990s. Other federal programs subsidizing affordable housing construction and rehabilitation by nonprofits included the Community Development Block Grant (HUD CDBG), the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities (HUD Sec. 811), and Housing Opportunities for People with Aids (HOPWA).

CDCs participation in affordable housing after the LIHTC program was instituted was minimal in Puerto Rico, whose HOME and CDBG programs subsidized most projects. Yet, as Figure 1 illustrates, nonprofit developers



**Table 2.** Puerto Rico Community Housing Development Organizations (CHDOs) Established by 2002

Organization (Incorporation Date)	Federal Programs	No. Proj.	New Const. Sale	New Const. Rent	Rehab Rent	Rehab Sale	Rehab Self-help	Total
CODEPCOVI – Corporación para el Desarrollo Económico Proyectos Comerciales y de Vivienda de Ponce (1995)	HOME, CDBG	8	187	65	14			266
Corporación para Desarrollo de Viviendas de Toa Baja, C.D.[1] (1995)	HOME, LIHTC	3	516	160				676
FUNDESCO – Fundación de Desarrollo Comunal de Puerto Rico (1996)	HOME, CDBG, Sec. 811	4		104				104
COCOPROVI – Comité Comunitario Pro Vivienda (1997)	HOME	1	24					24
La Fundita de Jesús (1985)	HOME, HOPWA,	2			11	25		36
Corporación Desarrolladora de Viviendas de las Barriadas de Israel y Bitumul (1996)	HOME, CDBG	1	109					109
Lucha Contra el SIDA (1994)	HOME	4	250	160		33		443
Apoyo Empresarial para la Península de Cantera (1992)	HOME, LIHTC	5	270				13	283
<b>Total</b>		28	1169	424	11	58	13	1675

Source: Rolando Ramos Bermúdez, *Las Primeras Historias Exitosas de los CHDOs en Puerto Rico*. Fundación Comunitaria de Puerto Rico. (2003).

Notes: [1] Corporación Especial de Desarrollo Municipal Sin Fines de Lucro.

Abbreviations:

HOME: HOME Investment Partnerships Program

CDBG: Community Development Block Grant


LIHTC: Low Income Housing Tax Credit

Sec. 811: Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities

HOPWA: Housing Opportunities for People with Aids»

played a significant role in affordable housing construction after the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 was enacted. ARRA allocated over \$206 million to HUD for Puerto Rico, with a significant portion of these funds specifically targeting “financing gaps caused by the reduction of equity investment in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program” (Recovery Tracker 2020). Figure 1 depicts the overall impact of the stimulus funding on nonprofit developers. In 2009 and 2010, nonprofit developers built more affordable housing using federal tax credits than private developers who up to that point (and after the ARRA program ended) dominated the industry. During the four-year window provided by the ARRA funding, nonprofit developers built over 3,000 units of housing. This is a particularly important finding in the current context of post-disaster economic recovery and the use of CDBG-DR funding for housing rehabilitation, reconstruction, and new construction. Given an inclusive policy implementation, nonprofit developers were able to quickly respond to the challenge and developed as many units as the private sector, demonstrating a rapid

**Figure 1.** Total Units of LIHTC-Subsidized Housing Construction or Rehabilitation in Puerto Rico by Placed-in-Service Year and Sponsor



Source: HUD's Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Database. Data available for projects placed in service through 2017. Retrieved 4-22-20 from: <<https://lihtc.huduser.gov/>>.

deployment capability and surpassing private sector production in the initial years of the program.

Despite the significant role that CDCs played during the financial crisis of 2009-10, the available evidence indicates that the ARRA windfall did not lead to a sustainable expansion of the community development industry in Puerto Rico. The question is, Why? We have identified about a dozen currently active CHDOs and CDFIs operating in Puerto Rico, but there is almost no systematic data collection or tracking of these and other CBOs organizations, let alone information about the type of activities that they engage in their capacity to undertake economic development projects. In this context, one notable capacity assessment was conducted about a decade ago by Enterprise's Puerto Rico—the CHDO Technical Assistance project.<sup>3</sup> In an island-wide needs assessment of 24 CHDOs and CDCs in Puerto Rico completed in 2014, they found a general lack of capacity to undertake affordable housing development activities, poor interactions with government officials and lenders, and absence of accessible predevelopment funds. In response to these findings, Enterprise provided technical assistance for the submission of proposals to HOME funds and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and created a pre-development lending pool with HUD Section 4 dollars,<sup>4</sup> among other activities. Since the study was conducted, pre-development funding and CHDO participation in the LIHTC program disappeared for all practical purposes.

The findings from the aforementioned Borges (2020) and Enterprise studies are very telling—if these are the conditions of the “readiest” organizations to undertake social entrepreneurship projects using federal economic recovery funding, one can only imagine the existing capacity among other nonprofit organizations. Yet, literally, hundreds of nonprofit organizations and local governments are currently seeking potential projects to tap into federal recovery funding. In the next section, we address several factors that explain the weakening of nonprofit developers after ARRA in general, such as public policy and a weak industry ecosystem.

### **Barriers to Nonprofit Developers in the Community Development Industry in Puerto Rico**

In our research and interviews with community leaders and other experts, we have identified three significant barriers to the development of the com-

munity development industry in Puerto Rico. These barriers are related to the key role of local implementation of federal policy, to the relatively small number and capacity of CDCs and financial intermediaries, and more generally to the nonprofit sector capacity to participate effectively in economic recovery and federal programs financing housing rehabilitation and reconstruction, urban and community development, and mitigation.

### **1. Exclusionary federal and local recovery funding policy**

In contrast to the example of ARRA stimulus inclusionary funding, current recovery funding policy and implementation have resulted in the outright exclusion or minimal participation of nonprofit developers. Puerto Rico's policy for recovery funding is centralized into two agencies: the Puerto Rico Housing Finance Agency for the allocation of CDBG-DR funding, and the Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency (COR3) for the management of FEMA funded programs. According to Torres-Cordero (2020), these two agencies function independently of each other and, in comparison to other U.S. jurisdictions, centralize decision-making and program implementation restricting municipal and nonprofit sector participation in publicly sponsored reconstruction projects. Though program authority remains within the federal oversight structure, the conventional practice in most states is to integrate reconstruction programs under one local agency and set up governance structures that promote interagency collaboration and are more inclusive of local governments and nonprofit organizations. Though the mechanisms for more inclusive participation vary under these types of governance and implementation arrangements, best practice examples include: subrecipient agreements to provide direct allocations to local governments (Louisiana, post-Hurricanes Gustav and Ike 2008); multiple local grantees including partnerships with nonprofit housing developers and community development corporations (South Carolina, post-Hurricane Joaquín 2015); regional differentiation through RFPs and joint ventures and partnerships between government agencies, for-profit and nonprofit organizations (Florida, post-Hurricane Irma, 2017); and, supplemental action planning and amendments to the action plan to redistribute resources from the state to county and city levels (Texas, post-Hurricane Harvey, 2017).

---

*All funding for this program was contracted to the private sector, with 62 percent of the contracts awarded to foreign corporations.*

---

The recent awards from the Puerto Rico Department of Housing Contracts to the Repair, Reconstruction, or Relocation Program (R3) program is the largest allocation of CDBG-DR funding to housing-related programs to date. Table 3 depicts the amount of funding for subcontractors to conduct housing rehabilitation, reconstruction or to facilitate relocation of disaster victims in Puerto Rico, and to other related programs. All funding for this program was contracted to the private sector, with 62 percent of the contracts awarded to foreign corporations. Though the nonprofit sector capacity to bid for these contracts was restricted given the specifications of the Notification of Funding Availability (NOFA) of the PRDOH as approved by HUD, other jurisdictions have implemented more inclusive policies to support capacity building for municipalities and local nonprofit contractors.

**Table 3.** CDBG-DR Program Contracts Procured By the Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH), 2018 to 2020

Contractor Name	Total	
R3 Total	644,916,123	89.2%
R3 Foreign Corporations	414,916,123	57.4%
R3 Domestic Corporations	230,000,000	31.8%
Other Programs: Foreign Corporations	33,237,766	4.6%
Other Programs: Domestic Corporations	44,978,503	6.2%
Total	723,132,393	100.0%

Sources: Puerto Rico Department of Housing, CDBG-DR Program. Accessed from: <<https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/contracts/>>. Puerto Rico Department of State, Registry of Corporations and Entities. Accessed from: <<https://prcorpfilling.flhst.com/CorporationSearch.aspx/>>.

More recent PRDOH's CDBG-DR program allocations have earmarked Government of Puerto Rico agencies, municipalities, and nonprofit organizations. Table 4 depicts data for Puerto Rico Department of Housing's Agreements with CDBG-DR Subrecipients from 2018 to 2020. Of the total \$679 million in agreements, 84 percent was allocated to government agen-

**Table 4.** Agreements with CDBG-DR Subrecipients, 2018 to 2020, Puerto Rico Department of Housing (PRDOH)

<b>Contractor Name</b>	<b>Total</b>	
<b>Agencies</b>	555,975,628	81.8%
Central Office for Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency (COR3)	89,783,000	
Department of Economic Development and Commerce (DDEC)	85,000,000	
Economic Development Bank for Puerto Rico (EDBPR)	25,000,000	
Puerto Rico Housing Financing Authority (AFV)	356,192,628	
<b>Municipalities</b>	37,607,088	5.5%
(a) 5 Mun. Receiving \$1m to \$1.5m	9,391,398	
(b) 14 Mun. Receiving \$1m to \$1.5	18,072,645	
(c) 39 Mun. Receiving \$283,045 to \$164,400	8,994,645	
(d) 17 Mun. 69,600 to 34,800	1,148,400	
<b>Government-Sponsored Nonprofit</b>	13,755,000	2.0%
Discover Puerto Rico (e)	8,000,000	
Invest Puerto Rico (f)	5,755,000	
<b>Nonprofit</b>	86,096,619	12.7%
Foundation for Puerto Rico (FPR)	37,500,000	
Puerto Rico Science, Research And Technology Trust	30,472,000	
(g) 6 CDCs Receiving Housing Counseling Program Funding	4,369,619	
<b>Total</b>	679,679,335	100.0%

## Notes:

(a) Ponce, Vieques, Aguadilla, Fajardo, Yabucoa.

(b) San Sebastian, Isabela, Naranjito, Coamo, Cidra, Gurabo, Villalba, Yauco, Orocovis, Aibonito, Camuy, Aguas Buenas, Maunabo, Luquillo.

(c) Ponce, Yauco, Villalba, Vega Alta, Toa Baja, San Lorenzo, San Germán, Sabana Grande, Rincón, Ponce, Patillas, Orocovis, Naranjito, Morovis, Maunabo, Manatí, Las Piedras, Las Marías, Lajas, Juncos, Juana Díaz, Jayuya, Isabela, Humacao, Culebra, Coamo, Cidra, Ciales, Cayey, Cataño, Canóvanas, Cabo Rojo, Barranquitas, Barceloneta, Arroyo, Arecibo, Aguada, Guayanilla, Dorado.

(d) Yabucoa, Vega Baja, Santa Isabel, Ponce, Naguabo, Las Marías, Las Piedra, Gurabo, Guaynabo, Fajardo, Comerío, Cataño, Camuy, Barranquitas, Añasco, Aguas Buenas, Guánica.

(e) Discover Puerto Rico is the official destination marketing organization (DMO) created by legislation in 2017.

(f) InvestPR is a nonprofit investment organization created by Act 13-2017.

(g) Pathstone Corporation, PueA25:D32rto Rico Neighborhood Housing Services Corp., Corporación Desarrollo Económico Vivienda y Salud (CODEVYS), Ponce Neighborhood Housing Services, INC., One Stop Career Center of Puerto Rico, Inc., Consumer Credit Counseling Services of Puerto Rico.

Sources: Puerto Rico Department of Housing, CDBG-DR Program. Accessed 10-6-20 from: <<https://cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/>>.

cies and two newly created government-affiliated nonprofit organizations. With the sole exception of the six CDCs that participate in the Housing Counseling program, these funding allocations were made without following a conventional solicitation process. Municipalities are earmarked to re-

ceive 5.5 percent of the funding allocated through agreements, and nonprofits were allocated 12.7 percent of the funding to manage programs to benefit municipalities and local communities. Most municipalities (56) received less than \$283,045. All in all, considering both contracts and agreements, non-government-affiliated nonprofit organizations are earmarked to receive 6.1 percent of the \$1.4 billion allocated so far from the CDBG-DR program, and municipalities 2.7 percent. This is a sharp contrast to 51.5 percent of funds allocated to the private sector, of which two-thirds are assigned to foreign corporations, and 39.6 percent to government agencies.

Despite the grim picture of CDBG-DR allocations supporting program activities implemented by nonprofit organizations and municipalities, there are a few factors to consider. For one, three years after Hurricane Maria landed in Puerto Rico, the CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs implementation are in their initial phases. For example, the R3 program represent only 14 percent of the total \$4.5 billion allocated to housing programs under CDBG-DR. Typically, recovery programs will start about one year after HUDs approval of the Action Plan. HUD's approval of the CDBG-DR Action Plan and first authorization of \$1.5 billion funding for Puerto Rico came on July 29, 2018. Extended delays and inconsistencies in federal disaster responses and long-term recovery funds in Puerto Rico are partly related to local factors such as local government capacity and preparedness, but also to endemic problems of federal policy implementation. According to Martin (2018, 4), in a review of CDBG-DR funding allocations from 2005–15, multiple factors contribute to the quality, speed, and costs of CDBG-DR implementation. Among these factors are those related to the specific disaster such as “the disaster severity and type and magnitude of damage, the preexisting state of housing quality and land use planning, and the quality of immediate relief and response efforts before longer-term recovery activity.” These problems seem to be affecting disaster recovery across the board. Federal Disaster Spending data for all disasters declared in 2017 indicate that from the total Congressional allocation to HUD of \$35.4 billion, as of July of 2020 less than one billion has been outlayed.<sup>5</sup> In Puerto Rico a similar pattern is seen—only a small fraction (\$96 million) has been outlayed to date from the total \$19.9 billion allocated to CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs. A final point is that the NOFAs issued in fiscal year 2019–2020 were affected by the pandemic. Many of these

solicitations (the acronym NOFA stands for Notice of Funding Availability) were solely for nonprofits or municipalities, and more recent solicitations included less restrictive qualifications for nonprofit organizations than prior solicitations. Yet since vendors for these programs have not been selected to date, it is an open question to what extent future implementation of CDBG-DR and CDBG-MIT programs will be more inclusive of nonprofit organizations, and for that matter municipalities.

In sum, Puerto Rico's housing and community development has been intricately connected to federal policy and to how local authorities have implemented such policies, from the extension of federal mortgage programs to Puerto Rico to the more recent allocation of CDBG-DR funding. Federal programs have subsidized over one hundred thousand public and affordable housing units. But, in contrast to the stateside experience, nonprofit developers have been relatively a small component of the housing and community development industry where private developers and the central government have played the dominant role. A critical exemption to this general assessment was during the financial crisis of 2009, when ARRA funding and the local implementation of federal policy was inclusive of nonprofit developers. In this context, it is important to understand how public policy and other factors have led to critical barriers to the role nonprofit developers play in the housing and community development industry in Puerto Rico, and how these policies curtail their potential contribution to economic reconstruction.

## **2. *Weak Community Development Ecosystem***

The economic crisis in Puerto Rico and the ongoing responses to the devastation of Hurricane Maria have heightened the need for and stimulate the advancement of community development intermediaries. Puerto Rico's community development and social enterprises ecosystem is developing through the growth of networks that support CDCs and other CBOs specifically for social entrepreneurship. If these trends continue, they could play a vital role in forging a national advocacy coalition for capacity building and for the advancement of the industry in the era of economic reconstruction. In this section we summarize the most salient existing and evolving community development intermediaries.



The community development and social enterprises ecosystem is integrated by CDCs, CDFIs and other financial intermediaries (such as capacity building and training vendors, often subsidiaries or affiliated with financial intermediaries), and other sector-specific networks that play a key role as regional and national advocacy coalitions for the advancement of the industry.<sup>6</sup> In the housing and community development industry in the U.S., this business ecosystem has vested interests in building organizational capacity, expanding the industry, lobbying for supportive policies to insure sustainability, organizing timely forums to discuss new directions, best practices, and funding availability, training professionals to adapt to new regulations and funding, as well as other capacity building initiatives. Because stateside federal policy and reconstruction funding are extended to Puerto Rico, island-based organizations potentially could take advantage of all the benefits that these network organizations offer to their members.

Puerto Rico has no significant local financial intermediaries, with the notable exception of Banco Popular, which holds a significant portfolio of community development investments, but this portfolio is seemingly more modest in terms of support to nonprofit developers than comparable stateside financial institutions. However, some established stateside-based developers and intermediaries have developed or currently develop affordable housing projects in Puerto Rico. Among these are private developers, such as McCormack, Baron, Salazar, and the Richman Group, and nonprofit intermediaries, such as Acacia Network, Enterprise Community Partners, Habitat for Humanity, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NeighborWorks America), PathStone, Hogar Hispano, and the Local Initiative Corporation (LISC). Despite such an explicit interest in expanding operations in Puerto Rico, too few CDCs with significant operational capacity are a tangible barrier to the potential expansion of financial intermediaries, as CDCs typically maintain a steady pipeline of local development projects for the volume required for syndication and reasonable returns on the investment of financial intermediaries' organizational resources.

---

*The most significant constraint for community development intermediaries to expand their presence in Puerto Rico is the thin infrastructure of CDCs and other nonprofit organizations that could generate and develop social purpose economic development projects.*

---

Based on the findings of four recent events in Puerto Rico co-sponsored by the Center for Puerto Rican Studies (Centro) with a focus on social entrepreneurship and reconstruction,<sup>7</sup> community-based organizations and non-profits alluded to a vicious cycle that might be contributing to the industry's underdevelopment. The most significant constraint for community development intermediaries to expand their presence in Puerto Rico is the thin infrastructure of CDCs and other nonprofit organizations that could generate and develop social purpose economic development projects. The complexity of undertaking recovery projects using federal funding in the context of insufficient trained or experienced professionals and the scarcity of potential CDCs partners constitute a significant constraint for the expansion of social purpose or economic recovery projects undertaken by established or emerging local financial intermediaries.

The weak business ecosystem in Puerto Rico's community development industry results in a scattered industry strategy for reconstruction. Few netting organizations with a focus on social entrepreneurship and community development provide the mechanisms for systemic learning about environmental changes affecting the local industry. Furthermore, the scant number of intersectoral alliances and leading development intermediaries constitute a significant challenge for the island's incipient housing and community development industry. Typically, an ecosystem of industry associations in alliances with large financial intermediaries takes the lead in understanding policy changes and funding opportunities in the industry. Because financial intermediaries are involved in most transactions in the industry, often partnering with CDCs and other local private developers, they lead in developing the legal and financial mechanisms intended to take advantage of new funding opportunities. This is particularly evident in key reconstruction areas such as infrastructure (energy, water systems, land fields, and waste disposal systems, etc.), agriculture, and repurposing public buildings, to name a few.

Besides the LIHTC, the community development industry in the United States is financed through multiple federal programs, and often these programs are combined to finance different aspects of a project. Besides LIHTC subsidization of affordable housing and CDFIs low interest lending, other popular programs broadly utilized in the industry include New Market Tax Credits (NMTC), CDBG and HOME, USDA programs for rural develop-

ment, EDA programs for economic development programs, SBA small business support programs, and many others. These federal programs often are paired with state and local subsidies. Yet, in Puerto Rico, many federal social purpose programs are grossly underutilized.

According to the Congressional Task Force for the Economic Development of Puerto Rico, the island has the lowest HUBZone utilization of all jurisdictions, and non-residents receive six of every ten federal dollars allocated to the island in contracts. Though the “9 percent” LIHTC program is very competitive, and local authorities receive numerous proposals exceeding the capacity they have to support projects, the “4 percent” tax credit for affordable housing has been largely underutilized.<sup>8</sup> The current window of great opportunity for the island is provided by the availability of reconstruction funding and of other underutilized non-disaster related federal programs. In Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, for example, LIHTC 4 percent funding was combined with CDBG-DR for leveraging \$1.1 billion for the development of 8,448 units, of which 63 percent were affordable (Severino 2018). In addition, the current CDBG-DR program allocates \$413 million to the LIHTC-Gap program to provide gap funding for financing affordable rental housing units.

In addition to the window of opportunity opened by the CDBG-DR, FEMA and all other federal disaster funding, we need to consider the potential impact of non-disaster funding from Opportunity Zones, USDA, SBA, EDA and other federal agencies that potentially can be combined for financ-

**Table 5.** Puerto Rico’s Existing and Emerging Community Development Intermediaries

Organization	Revenues (\$)	Assets (\$)	Grants 2017 (e) (\$)
Puerto Rico Community Foundation (a)	9,132,268	37,819,101	3,271,315
Foundation for Puerto Rico (b)	6,149,360	6,990,888	2,638,490
Puerto Rico Science Technology and Research Trust (c)	22,996,445	115,682,560	NA
Para La Naturaleza (d)	16,271,811	7,855,342	665,000

Sources:

a. IRS Form 990Tax Filings for 2018.

b. IRS Form 990Tax Filings for 2018.

c. IRS Form 990Tax Filings for 2018.

d. IRS Form 990Tax Filings for 2017. Para la Naturaleza is a subsidiary of the Puerto Rico Conservation Trust with income of \$28,770,630 and \$459,093,965 in Assets in 2018.

e. Foundation Center, 2019.

ing projects. These programs offer a window of opportunity for the island to attract capital investment, especially potential investments in the housing and community development industry. All these programs are applied in different ways to economic development and target different types of populations. CDCs and financial intermediaries specialize in certain sectors of the community development industry. For example, there are CDCs and financial intermediaries that focus on affordable housing; some even specialize further in the use of 4 percent financing. Other pursue the construction of schools and other commercial facilities using NMTC. In other words, industry strategies are often developed targeting specific sectors.

There are two nonprofit organizations that were created to serve as community development intermediaries with programs to support nonprofit and private organizations. Founded in 1984, the Puerto Rico Community Foundation (PRCF) is perhaps the oldest organization with an established program to support organizations' community-based economic development and social entrepreneurship, and to a far less extent, affordable housing. In 2018, PRCF had \$9 million in revenue and \$38 million in assets (Table 5). Besides a conventional community foundation giving program, recently the PRCF created the Community Investment Fund to help capitalize community economic development through loans up to \$250,000. Post disaster, besides relief assistance to nonprofit organizations, they have renewed their efforts to support core infrastructure projects in housing, energy, and water. This fund can be potentially used to cover housing, commercial, and other real estate transactions. In addition, PRCF in partnership with Enterprise Community Partners (Enterprise) and NeighborWorks America launched the Puerto Rico Nonprofit Capacity Building Network. This recent initiative provides six local CDCs a \$35,000 operational grant, technical assistance, and one-to-one staff mentoring in addition to providing a structured peer-to-peer component for capacity building.

Founded in 2011, Foundation for Puerto Rico (FPR) is a nonprofit organization implementing an economic development initiative based on destination tourism in partnership with local governments and nonprofits organizations. These partnerships are known in the literature as Comprehensive Community Initiatives (Stagner and Duran 1997), in this case with a focus on the development of regional tourism. Currently, in 2018, FPR has revenues of \$6 million and \$7 mil-

lion in assets (Table 5). Beginning in 2019, FPR received \$37.5 million CDBG-DR funding from the Puerto Rico Department of Housing to lead the coordination of the Whole Community Resilience Planning Program (Foundation for Puerto Rico 2019). According to the Foundation Center, in 2019, FPR and PRCF received six million dollars in grants to support community organizations (Table 5).

Besides the FCPR and the FPR, there are two other important organizations that are initiating or renewing efforts for community development programs and potentially can have great impact on fostering social entrepreneurship in Puerto Rico. Two of the most important emerging community development intermediaries are established as public trusts. The Puerto Rico Science, Technology & Research Trust (PRSTRT) has undertaken several social ventures and developed specific business development models that serve as capacity-building and financial intermediaries especially for technology companies. In 2018, the PRSTRT was the largest intermediary in Puerto Rico worth \$23 million in revenues and \$116 million in assets (Table 5). Two of PRSTRT signature programs, Parallel18 and Colmena 66, focus on business development--the first as an incubator and accelerator, while the second support the entrepreneurship ecosystem. Though these programs focus on innovation and scaling up private businesses, this infrastructure could be extended to support social purpose enterprises and the nonprofit sector. The PRDOH recently allocated \$92.5 million from the CDBG-DR program to the PRSTRT for the implementation of the Re-grow Puerto Rico Urban-Rural Agriculture Program.

Para la Naturaleza (PLN) is a nonprofit subsidiary of the Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico that oversees 42 natural areas throughout the island that are managed as social ventures, and implement fundraising, educational and volunteerism initiatives. Though their focus is environmental conservation and ecotourism, they increased their community development activities and partnerships after Hurricane Maria. They have significant organizational capacity, and their programs are already promoting sustainable development and conservation and impacting partnering communities. In 2018, PLN had \$16 million in revenues and \$8 million in assets (Table 5). These two public trusts have played a prominent role in reconstruction, implemented numerous programs with local community organizations, and have the revenues and assets capacity to evolve into the anchors of the community development industry.

In sum, PRCF, FPR, PRTRT and PLN are intermediaries that play or have the potential capacity to play a leadership role in the community development industry, and for fostering understanding among nonprofit organizations of how federal reconstruction funding can support social entrepreneurship and the development of the housing and community development industry in Puerto Rico. An evident gap in the emergent industry eco-system is a specialized intermediary supporting, financing and underwriting affordable housing development.

### **3. Too few professionals with experience in federal economic recovery programs**

The development of CDCs and by implication the housing and community development industry in Puerto Rico is largely a workforce development challenge. In Puerto Rico, there is a wealth and abundant supply of well-trained, talented, and experienced nonprofit and business professionals. However, there are not enough professionals with social entrepreneurship and community economic development skills in the industry, especially professionals with the understanding of reconstruction programs and other federal programs supporting the housing and community development industry. The root cause of this barrier for community development is the actual abandonment of CDCs support through public policy though there are other impinging factors such as the availability of capacity building programs in the industry and the scarcity of specialized professional development training.

---

*No academic or training organization has implemented a systematic program for the typical skills development required in the field.*

---

The scarcity of professionals who have experience in community development, housing and commercial real estate development, and social entrepreneurship (i.e., the use and management of federal and local government funding programs for a social purpose program) is compounded by the lack of training and workforce development programs for the development of industry professionals. No academic or training organization has implemented a systematic program for the typical skills development required in the field. This is not to say that, for example, there are no for-

credit or continuing education courses on real estate investment offered in Puerto Rico or on proposals preparation. The point is that few continuing education courses, workshops, and other forms of training and capacity building are offered with a focus on the skill sets and specific content required for economic recovery programs or the development and rehabilitation of affordable housing using federal programs such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and HOME, or the New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) for commercial development, or other similar programs devoted to this type of specialized financing. Practitioners who have acquired these skills had prior stateside experience or learned through local experiences with a relatively steep learning curve. On the whole, the available pool of experienced professionals in the social entrepreneurship field in Puerto Rico is limited, insufficient for the challenge of reconstruction, and constitute a real impediment for the expansion of the industry.

Though there are very capable community planners and social entrepreneurs in Puerto Rico, they are insufficient for the present challenges posed by recovery and reconstruction, and they are unevenly distributed across the island. Furthermore, even among those with expertise in social entrepreneurship, every active professional in the field is facing a new and challenging context (*e.g.*, the advent of CDGB-DR and mitigation funding) that requires a deeper understanding of the environment in which municipal and community programs currently operate. A first step is to recognize the need to adapt and, in many cases, introduce, concepts and practices of community development, disaster recovery planning, and social entrepreneurship in Puerto Rico to face the new challenges posed by post-disaster recovery.

We decided to ascertain the training needs of community development professionals for the implementation of post-disaster planning for economic recovery for Puerto Rico based on a social entrepreneurship approach. To accomplish our goal, we conducted a survey for the assessment of professional skills. The survey was distributed to professionals directly involved or overseeing programs that are part of or align with the economic and disaster recovery plans for Puerto Rico. The study was voluntary, and the respondents had the option of not answering any question. Eighty-seven (87) professionals participated in the study. The survey was conducted as a convenience sample and directed to all organizations identified as part of

the housing and community development industry. We asked participants questions regarding work objectives, educational attainment, modalities for courses, preferential options for learning the competencies, and municipalities in which they worked in.

A core finding from the survey of professional skills is that, even though self-selection of survey respondents biased results toward the most educated and experienced, there are significant gaps in knowledge to undertake effectively planning and economic development projects in the context of federal programs devoted to reconstruction. Survey participants were highly educated, reflecting a bias toward organizational leaders. Nearly half of the participants had a master's degree (45.5 percent), followed by a bachelor's degree (29.9 percent), and Ph.D. (18.2 percent). Overall, two-thirds of the participants had a graduate level education. In other words, survey respondents were community leaders most likely to show advanced community planning in economic development skills. The survey also indicates that there is great interest among community leaders across all fields for professional training that targets professional skills gaps in the community development industry and among nonprofit organizations in general. Professionals in the field seem to prefer online continuing education courses to traditional academic formats.

Regarding objectives for professional work and social impact, participants were asked to choose from the following: Affordable Housing, Community Development, Education, Economic Development, Infrastructure, Civic Engagement, Food and Agriculture, and/or Health and other. Community Development was the area with the largest group of participants' objectives with 30.4 percent. The following objective was Education (15.8 percent), then Economic Development (12.3 percent), Infrastructure (11.7 percent), Health and other (9.4 percent), Affordable Housing (8.8 percent), Food and Agriculture (6.4 percent), and lastly Civic Engagement (5.3 percent). Whether these general findings from a self-selected group of practitioners could be extrapolated more generally to the overall staff of nonprofit organizations, let alone to community leaders, remains an open question. Yet, the findings from the survey offer the only available evidence regarding how professionals immerse in reconstruction efforts perceive their own skills to implement these programs.



The survey asked respondents to assess their level of knowledge in a range of competencies that were categorized into four areas encompassing corresponding competencies: Community Planning, Social Entrepreneurship and Economic Reconstruction, Municipal and Regional Economic Development, and Community and Municipality Master Plans. We asked survey respondents to indicate their level of proficiency for each of the competencies. They were offered the following description of the various levels of proficiency:

Minimal or none.

Basic. Familiarity with the competency. You may have a general understanding of the concepts and methods associated with the competency.

Intermediate. In addition to basic, you have some practical experience on the subject. You may have applied the competency in a community or municipal context under the supervision of someone more experienced in the field.

Advanced. In addition to intermediate, you have worked extensively in the field applying the competency, possibly supervising others in a community or municipal work context. If there are new circumstances or methods required, you feel confident to be able to learn those on your own, with little or no support from others.

Within the Community Planning category, we listed eight (8) different competencies such as conducting risk analysis or community engagement. In reference to Table 6, most respondents had basic knowledge of the eight planning competencies listed. Basic knowledge was the most selected level of knowledge from six out of the eight competencies listed followed by Minimal or none. The competencies participants determined they had the most knowledge of were in Establishing community priorities and Conducting community engagement. However, most participants within these competencies still had basic knowledge of them. On the other hand, the competency participants selected they had the lowest level of knowledge was Risks assessment and background research. Overall, the participants had basic to minimal or no knowledge within the Community Planning competency category.

**Table 6.** Community Planning

	Minimal/none	Basic	Intermediate	Advanced
Principles Planning Econ. Recovery	28.7%	36.8%	16.1%	18.4%
Risk Assessment and Background Research	42.4%	32.9%	16.5%	8.2%
Conducting Soc/Environ/Econ Impact Analysis	33.3%	44.8%	10.3%	11.5%
Identify potential strategic initiatives	25.3%	34.5%	23.0%	17.2%
Restructuring municipal governments	38.4%	33.7%	17.4%	10.5%
Establishing community priorities	24.1%	29.9%	25.3%	20.7%
Conducting community engagement	22.1%	38.4%	18.6%	20.9%
Conducting community events	9.8%	35.3%	27.5%	27.5%

Table 7 summarizes the results for the set of six (6) competencies associated with Social Entrepreneurship and Economic Reconstruction. Like the Community Planning category, most respondents selected either having basic or minimal to no knowledge across the Social entrepreneurship and Economic reconstruction competencies. “Minimal to none” was the most selected level of knowledge followed by basic knowledge, and an equal number of participants having intermediate and advanced knowledge of economic reconstruction competencies. The competency that participants had the most knowledge on was Identification of community development assets. However, nearly half of the participants within this competency still had basic knowledge of it. On the other hand, the competency participants selected they had the lowest level of knowledge was the Developing affordable housing projects and Developing commercial real estate syndication opportunities. In general, survey respondents had basic to minimal or no knowledge of competency in the Economic Reconstruction category.

Regarding the Municipal and Regional Economic Development category, depicted in Table 8, participants selected having minimal to no knowledge the most—in five of the six competencies listed. Nearly half of the participants selected were recorded as having Minimal to no knowledge followed by basic, intermediate, and, lastly, advanced. In reference to all the categories, Municipal and Regional Economic Development has the least number of participants with advanced knowledge across all the competencies listed. The competency that participants selected they had the least amount of knowledge was Development of strategies to stabilize neighborhoods. On the other hand, the com-

**Table 7.** Social Entrepreneurship and Social Reconstruction

	Minimal/none	Basic	Intermediate	Advanced
Identification of community development assets	21.4%	40.5%	15.5%	22.6%
Identification of social entrepreneurship options	21.2%	44.7%	18.8%	15.3%
Developing affordable housing projects	52.9%	27.1%	10.6%	9.4%
Developing syndication opportunities	62.4%	27.1%	5.9%	4.7%
Developing commercial and/or mixed-used project	50.0%	36.6%	6.1%	7.3%
Developing social enterprise options	27.4%	46.4%	14.3%	11.9%

**Table 8.** Municipal and Regional Economic Development

	Minimal/none	Basic	Intermediate	Advanced
Developing municipal circular economy	37.0%	42.0%	14.8%	6.2%
Developing municipal solar coops	50.0%	32.1%	11.9%	6.0%
Developing neighborhood stabilization strategies	54.1%	30.6%	9.4%	5.9%
Developing visitor-based economic development	44.7%	41.2%	9.4%	4.7%
Promoting recycling ordinances and executive orders	50.6%	32.9%	11.8%	4.7%
Creating a regional workforce development plan	48.8%	38.4%	7.0%	5.8%

**Table 9.** Community and Municipal Master Plans

	Minimal/none	Basic	Intermediate	Advanced
Developing a municipal or community master plan	41.2%	29.4%	18.8%	10.6%
Using community visioning	24.4%	37.8%	15.9%	22.0%
Developing market analysis and policy scenarios	30.2%	44.2%	17.4%	8.1%
Developing an action and implementation plan	25.9%	31.8%	25.9%	16.5%
Preparing a final report of a municipal master plan	40.0%	28.0%	16.0%	16.0%
Integrating the regions	42.0%	34.0%	18.0%	6.0%
Presentation of the municipal master plan to stakeholders	38.0%	20.0%	26.0%	16.0%

petency listed that had the highest amount of knowledge was Development of the municipal circular economy. However, most participants within this competency still expressed basic knowledge. All in all, throughout the competencies listed in this category, the participants had minimal to no knowledge of developing municipal or regional economies.

Table 9 summarizes findings for the Community and Municipal Master Plans competencies category. Most survey respondents either had basic

knowledge or minimal to no knowledge of these competencies. Most respondents selected having intermediate knowledge of competencies in this area of expertise when compared to the prior two categories discussed. Like the Community Planning category, there was a greater range between the levels of knowledge within this group of competencies related to the development of municipal master plans. Both basic knowledge and minimal to none accounted for about 60 percent of respondents or above. The succeeding level of knowledge was intermediate, followed by advanced. The competencies that participants selected they had the least amount of knowledge of were Integration of the regions and Development of market analysis and political scenarios. On the other hand, the competency they had the highest amount of knowledge was the Use of community vision. However, like all other categories discussed, most of the participants had minimal to no knowledge of community and municipality master plans.

In addition to examining competencies proficiency, we participants were asked to identify preferences for course delivery. We asked them to choose from the following: an Online Course, Regular Course, Summer Course, Seminar and/or Over the Weekend. The majority of participants preferred the competencies to be taught as an Online Course (37.2 percent), followed by in a Seminar (32.1 percent), Over the Weekend (25.5 percent), and the least preferred options were the Summer Course (2.6 percent) and the Regular Course (2.6 percent). Participants were also asked to select in which modality they would like the courses: Continuing Education, For Credit: postgraduate, For Credit: current grade, or a Non-academic Certificate. More than half of the participants selected Continuing Education for their preferred course mode (55.8 percent), followed by a Non-academic Certificate (28.6 percent), For Credit: postgraduate (10.4 percent), and For Credit: undergraduate (5.2 percent).

Based on the results of the survey, I conclude that respondents revealed a need for a continuing education online courses that covers all competencies associated with economic and disaster recovery plans for Puerto Rico, particularly those focusing on community economic development and planning. Professionals in the field are interested in the systematic development of skills associated with the implementation of post-disaster planning for economic recovery for Puerto Rico and on social entrepreneurship. Even

among those most educated and actively engaged in the industry there is a recognition for the need for the development of professional skills in the industry moving forward. Findings from the survey provide a clear picture of the professional skills gap and a pathway to close it.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

In this study I review the evidence and assess the capacity of the nonprofit sector to become an active participant in the economic recovery of Puerto Rico. Specifically, I sought to answer the question whether the nonprofit sector would be able to take advantage of this window of opportunity to contribute to the economic recovery of Puerto Rico while inducing a much broader community participation and strengthening the community development industry of the island. I also examined the factors that may contribute to the advancement or stand as barriers to nonprofit and municipal participation in recovery programs. The evidence presented in this report based on an empirical examination of the field leads us to the following conclusions when examining such critical questions.

---

*In contrast, CDCs and nonprofit developers demonstrated that, when given the opportunity during the ARRA program, they were able to build more than 3,000 units of housing using the LIHTC program and surpassed the number of housing units built by the profit sector.*

---

First, to date, federal recovery programs implementation, and more specifically recovery funding policy, have resulted in the outright exclusion or minimal participation of nonprofit developers in publicly sponsored reconstruction projects. The recent awards for housing rehabilitation and reconstruction, the largest funding allocated to date for housing, was solely awarded to the private sector, with 62 percent of the contracts awarded to foreign corporations. In contrast, CDCs and nonprofit developers demonstrated that, when given the opportunity during the ARRA program, they were able to build more than 3,000 units of housing using the LIHTC program and surpassed the number of housing units built by the profit sector. Yet, the ARRA experiment led only to short-term gains. A study conducted

shortly after demonstrated that a reversal of public policy led directly to the exclusion of nonprofit developers from the LIHTC and other programs.

Second, the nonprofit sector capacity to participate in the post-disaster economic recovery phase is limited. In part the lack of capacity is attributed to their focus on education, community development, and health programs prior to the disaster, and that only a fraction of nonprofit organizations implemented housing and economic development programs that constitute the focus of the post-disaster economic recovery phase. Yet there are other reasons for the lack of capacity in economic recovery in general; more specifically, these reasons affect the use of federal funding. Among others, organizations reported on the need to have better access to information, predevelopment funds, staff training in recovery issues, and technical assistance for projects and submission of proposals as key areas for organizational development in the era of reconstruction.

Third, a close examination of CDCs in Puerto Rico revealed that there are too few nonprofit organizations devoted to affordable housing rehabilitation and construction, and to other community economic development projects. Though these organizations exhibit a wide range of capacity to implement development projects, they have a limited operational and financial capacity for real estate development and only a few have undertaken housing counseling or rehabilitation but no other recovery-related economic development project. In general, the nonprofit sector participation in economic recovery is also limited by the number of professional staff with social entrepreneurship and community development skills, especially professionals with the understanding of reconstruction programs and other federal programs available or to become available to Puerto Rico in the near future.

Fourth, one of the critical barriers for the development of the community development industry in Puerto Rico is the lack of professionals with the skills to implement federal economic recovery programs, housing and economic development, and community planning. The first step in the development of professional training for the community development industry involves understanding the Governor's Action Plan, which governs the allocation of funding for economic recovery. An assessment of the tasks and competencies associated with the implementation of the Action Plan calls for the development of economic recovery and community planning training that is interdisciplinary,

empowers participant to collect and analyze data relevant for the implementation of recovery projects, and an understanding of regions, municipal reconstruction, and the policy context in which these programs operate.

These general findings from the study serve as a foundation for the following recommendations:

### **Policy**

**1.** Inclusionary policy reforms to support nonprofit developers and CDCs. The evidence indicates the need to set up governance structures that promote policies that are more inclusive of local governments and nonprofit organizations. Examples of best practices inclusionary policies from other states include subrecipient agreements to provide direct allocations to municipalities, promoting partnerships with nonprofit housing developers and community development corporations, regional differentiation through RFPs and joint ventures and partnerships between government agencies, for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and supplemental action planning and amendments to the action plan to redistribute resources from the state to county and city levels.

### **CDC capacity building**

**2.** Development of a low-cost, high-risk predevelopment fund for CDCs. Capacity building among nonprofit organizations require targeted strategies. For the existing CDCs with some experience in housing and other community development activities, organizational capacity building requires subsidization of predevelopment costs and technical support for submissions of competitive proposals for FEMA, CDBG-DR, and other economic recovery targeted funding, as well as for the combination of such funds with other traditional community development programs such as housing tax credits, new market tax credits, USDA programs, and the understanding of newer programs such as Opportunity Zones. Predevelopment costs are a critical barrier in Puerto Rico since the few financing programs for these types of projects that exist are not designed to serve high-risk projects and often require CDCs to comply to terms like those offered by the commercial banking industry.

**3.** Promoting intra-industry partnerships. Economic recovery in Puerto Rico is beginning, with only a fraction of funding allocated to programs. For effective

nonprofit participation in recovery programs it is urgent to accelerate project development capacity. A proven strategy to improve capacity in the short term to develop housing rehabilitation and construction projects is for established CDCs to partner with nonprofit organizations that would like to implement community development projects in their neighborhoods. Effective project development requires not just financial means and real estate or economic development expertise, but also local organizing and public sector support for the project. Nonprofit organizations can generate local support in partnership with experience developers. Nonprofits lacking CDC-type capacity will probably require partnerships with established CDCs or other intermediaries with development capacity and understanding of disaster recovery funding when implementing the first generation of projects.

4. Development of support for nonprofits to become CDCs. Though creating a predevelopment fund could be a relevant strategy for capacity building among nonprofit organizations that are seeking ways to engage in economic recovery, for the typical nonprofit organization lacking any experience in housing, real estate and economic development participating in such activities is a more challenging task. For these organizations to participate in programs financed through federal programs for post disaster economic recovery, professional development for current staff on housing and community economic development and the understanding of federal funding is imperative. In addition, nonprofit organizations involved in economic recovery will benefit from organizational assessments and strategic planning processes in close connection and engagement of the communities they serve. In this transition to community economic development it is common for nonprofit organizations to revamp their board of directors to include more professionals with business expertise and to promote residents' participation in community planning.

#### **Professional training**

5. Development of professional training for post-disaster economic recovery. Professional development is at the core of the expansion of housing and economic development projects and programs in the nonprofit sector. The experience of CDCs and other nonprofit organizations with training



in Puerto Rico is mixed. Common barriers involve the lack of funding targeting these programs and the time commitment of their staff, given that these organizations have limited staff and financial resources. In addition, most of the training in Puerto Rico is offered as workshops targeting specific topics. CBO leadership expressed frustration with the abundant and fragmented supply of disconnected and abstract workshops with little value-added to contribute to their operations. By comparison, in the business capacity development field there are well-structured programs with a comprehensive curriculum, an embedded technical assistant, and a support ecosystem. The findings from the survey on the preparedness of professionals in the field indicate that professionals in the community development field prefer comprehensive courses offered as continuing education, and online course offerings or structured as seminars.

### **Industry ecosystem**

**6. Strengthening community development intermediaries.** The development of intermediaries requires the scaling up of capacity to serve as a financial intermediary and to provide technical assistance to members of the network of nonprofit developers. Puerto Rico does not yet have a specialized Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) for housing financing and development, with underwriting capabilities, and only Banco Popular is a Community Development Entity (CDE). Of all the actors in the industry, the cooperative sector with a substantial financial assets base is in the best position to strengthen existing credit unions that operate CDFIs to build up capacity for housing development and underwriting. These financial intermediaries are important for both understanding the plethora of federal programs available to nonprofit developers, including complex transactions involving syndication and the combination of funding required for most housing and commercial development projects, and the complexity of bidding, managing, and complying with federal recovery programs. Ultimately, the establishment of these institutions depend on a steady stream of viable projects, which in turn rely on capacity building of nonprofit developers.

**7. Creation of a hub for the exchange of information and networking.** An urgent need in the industry is to create communication mechanisms and

shared knowledge of effective practices for community and economic development in the era of reconstruction. This could be achieved through forums and conferences, publications, newsletters, web seminars, and other means of dissemination of effective community practices; the provision of community services; the analysis of policies; and the exchange of ideas for the well-being of residents and communities. These communication mechanisms also promote the dissemination of integral and sustainable community development research. In addition, such a hub could make available basic information for networking and community building such as a directory of individuals and organizations, a calendar of activities, and opportunities for volunteerism and collaborations.

**8. Creation of a data hub.** The research presented in this report indicates the need for a hub to easily access data, ideally as interactive GIS maps available for each community and municipality in the island, and to construct visualizations for community planning and contribute to crowdsourcing data efforts. Data collection is also important for tracking progress in overcoming the barriers to the growth of the community development industry and social entrepreneurship. Ideally, there would be an ongoing directory of individuals and organizations, an easily accessible repository of grants available and funded projects, and an industry communication platform. Besides the obvious direct benefit of this type of data collection on understanding the industry and the needs of professionals and organizations, data collection and analysis would be beneficial for formulating business and sector strategies. Centro's RebuildPR digital platform is one step in that direction. This platform currently contains a comprehensive set of layers available to the public. Next steps involve the training of community groups for the use of the platform for community planning and development. Training in the use of this data hub will serve as a complement to professional training for post-disaster economic recovery.

In conclusion, post-disaster federal funding for economic recovery offers Puerto Rico a unique window of opportunity to restore its economy and infrastructure in a more resilient fashion while strengthening the non-profit sector capacity for community planning, housing development, and neighborhood revitalization. However, such an opportunity is contingent

on reforming local public policy and implementing a comprehensive sector strategy to encourage and support nonprofit developers participation in reconstruction programs, building industry capacity by strengthening intermediaries, and CDCs, encouraging intra-industry partnerships and collaborations, and providing professional development for economic recovery.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers of the original manuscript for providing insightful comments and providing directions for the additional work that has resulted in this paper. I would like to thank Damayra Figueroa-Lazu for her support retrieving and organizing the data for tables and graphics. This study would not have been possible without the support and willingness of the leadership and staff of the various community-based organizations who contributed to this research. I would like to extend my gratitude to: Reverendo Heriberto Martínez, Presidente, La Sociedad Bíblica de Puerto Rico, who provided our researchers with office space and other support infrastructure; to Centro's Staff Alejandra Del Monte Medina, Diana Ramos, and Elisa Sánchez Torres for support during various conferences on the topic and with general coordination for the research projects; to the research assistants who conducted case studies and compiled other data, including José Luis Colón, Yamil Corvalán, Miriam Morales Suárez, and Katsyris Rivera Kientz; to Professor Ivis García Zambrana from the University of Utah, who coordinated the skills project Institutional Review Board compliance and provided valuable feedback on the manuscript; and to Professors Ramón Borges-Méndez and Ariam Torres for reading an early version of the manuscript. Finally, I want to thank members of the Grupo Académico de IDEAComún for their valuable input and support: Marinés Aponte; Antonio J. Fernós Sagebien; Federico Del Monte; Nilsa Medina Piña; Omayra Rivera Crespo; Luisa Seijó; and Rafael A. Torrech San Inocencio.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This plan was prepared by the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC), a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) that RAND operates for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

<sup>2</sup> With the Department of Housing and Urban Development recent release of \$9.7 billion in Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery funding, a total of \$22 billion has been obligated from the total of \$44 billion across 14 agencies to disasters in Puerto Rico (Office of Management and Budget 2020).

<sup>3</sup> Enterprise's technical assistance to the Puerto Rico Housing Finance Authority and Department of Housing was recommended by the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico in March 2011 and concluded with the approval of an updated State Housing Plan by the Puerto Rico Housing Policy and Implementation Committee on 24 October 2014. The updated plan included a concrete action plan and implementation schedule, and a "better targeting resources to meet community needs and improving the quality of program delivery" (see <<https://www.enterprisecomunity.org/solutions-and-innovation/technical-assistance-and-consulting/directa-and-capacity-building/>>).

<sup>4</sup> The Section 4 Capacity Building for Community Development and Affordable Housing (Section 4) program strengthens low-income communities across the nation by providing critical support to local nonprofit organizations that develop affordable housing, finance small businesses, revitalize commercial corridors, and help address local healthcare, childcare, education, and safety needs. Enterprise is one of four organizations eligible for the program.

<sup>5</sup> Source: FEMA's Spending Explorer, Data as of 1 September 2020.

<sup>6</sup> A business ecosystem is the network of organizations — including suppliers, distributors, customers, competitors, government agencies, and so on — involved in the delivery of a specific product or service through both competition and cooperation (Hays 2019).

<sup>7</sup> Resiliencia y Solidaridad: Encuentro con la Diáspora Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 2018; Empresarismo Social y Reconstrucción, 5 October 2018, at Universidad de Puerto Rico, and 6 October 2018, Industriales de Puerto Rico. Simposio de Empresarismo Social y Reconstrucción Económica, Universidad Interamericana, Recinto Metropolitano, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 7 August 2019; Simposio Vivienda y Desarrollo Económico Comunitario en Puerto Rico, 5 February 2020, Colegio de Abogados, Miramar, Puerto Rico.

<sup>8</sup> The Non-Competitive (4 percent) Housing Tax Credit program is coupled with the Multifamily Bond Program when the bonds finance at least 50 percent of the cost of the land and buildings in the development.

#### REFERENCES

- Alameda-Lozada, José I. and Carlos Alberto Rivera Galindo. 2005. *La Vivienda de Interés Social en Puerto Rico*. San Juan: Departamento de la Vivienda, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.
- Borges-Méndez, Ramón. 2020. *Community Development Corporations and Reconstruction Policy in Puerto Rico*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Butteriss, Crispin. 2020. What is community engagement, exactly Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://www.bangthetable.com/blog/defining-community-engagement/>>.
- Center on Disaster Philanthropy. 2020. *Puerto Rico Earthquakes*. 9 March. Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/puerto-rico-earthquakes/>>.
- Central Office of Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency. 2018. *Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico*. 8 August.
- COSSEC, Corporación Pública para Supervisión y Seguro de Cooperativas de Puerto Rico. 2018. *Total de Activos, Número de Socios y de Empleados, Por Cooperativa 30 junio*. Accessed 30 August 2020. <[http://www.cossec.com/cossec\\_new/est/Junio18/Anejo\\_9\\_Total\\_de\\_Activos,\\_Socios\\_y\\_Empleados\\_Tiempo\\_Completo\\_Por\\_Cooperativa\\_jun\\_2018.pdf/](http://www.cossec.com/cossec_new/est/Junio18/Anejo_9_Total_de_Activos,_Socios_y_Empleados_Tiempo_Completo_Por_Cooperativa_jun_2018.pdf/)>.
- Cotto, Liliana. 1993. *The Rescate Movement*. In *Colonial Dilemma: Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Puerto Rico*, eds. Edwin Meléndez and Edgardo Meléndez. Boston: South End Press.
- Dyer, Christopher L. 1999. *The Phoenix Effect in Post-Disaster Recovery: An Analysis of the Economic Development Administration's Culture of Response after Hurricane Andrew*. In *The Angry Earth: Disaster in Sociological Perspective*, eds. Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susana Hoffman. New York: Routledge.
- Eller, Warren, Brian J. Gerber and Lauren E. Branch. 2015. *Voluntary Nonprofit Organizations and Disaster Management: Identifying the Nature of Inter-Sector Coordination and Collaboration in Disaster Service Assistance Provision*. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy* 6(2), 223–38.

- Foundation for Puerto Rico. 2019. Foundation for Puerto Rico Begins Phase One Of Whole Community Resilience Program. 15 January. Accessed 31 August 2020. <[https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59e4cf35a8b2b019331ce112/t/5c3e08c203ce640330cd5e0e/1547569347160/FOUNDATION+FOR+PUERTO+RICO+BEGINS+PHASE+ONE\\_ENGLISH\\_01-15-19-converted.pdf/](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59e4cf35a8b2b019331ce112/t/5c3e08c203ce640330cd5e0e/1547569347160/FOUNDATION+FOR+PUERTO+RICO+BEGINS+PHASE+ONE_ENGLISH_01-15-19-converted.pdf/)>.
- Fuller-Marvel, Lucilla. 2008. Building a Just, Integrated and Sustainable Planning and Housing System: The Puerto Rican Experience. Paper presented at the 52nd IFHP World Congress on Housing and Planning Housing Beyond Its Walls: Planning for an Affordable and Sustainable Housing, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Accessed 31 August 2020. <<http://spp-pr.org/oct2012/old/images/documents/ifhp/plenarias/Construyendo%20un%20sistema%20de%20Planificacion%20...%20Lucilla%20Fuller%20Marvel.pdf/>>.
- García, Ivis and Divya Chandrasekhar. 2020. Impact of Hurricane María to the Civic Sector: A Profile of Nonprofits in Puerto Rico. *CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies* 32(3), 67–88.
- Hayes, Adam. 2019. Social Entrepreneur. Investopedia. Updated 13 August 2019. Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-entrepreneur.asp/>>.
- Hoffman, Alexander von. 2013. The past, present, and future of community development: The changing face of achieving equity in health, education, and housing in the United States. *Shelterforce* 17 July. Accessed 31 August 2020. <[https://shelterforce.org/2013/07/17/the\\_past\\_present\\_and\\_future\\_of\\_community\\_development/](https://shelterforce.org/2013/07/17/the_past_present_and_future_of_community_development/)>.
- Johnson, Laurie, and Robert Olshansky. 2017. *After Great Disasters: An In-Depth Analysis of How Six Countries Managed Community Recovery*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Martín, Carlos. 2018. The Evidence Based on how CDBG-DR Works for State and Local Stakeholders. Statement of Carlos Martín, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives. 17 May 2018.
- May, Peter J. and Walter Williams. 1986. *Disaster Policy Implementation: Managing Programs under Shared Governance*. New York: Springer.
- McDonnell, Simon, Pooya Ghorbani, Courtney Wolf, Maria Jessa Cruz, David M. Burgy, Swati Desai, Daniel Berkovits and Renata Silberblatt. 2019. A Managed-Participatory Approach to Community Resilience: The Case of the New York Rising Community Reconstruction Program. *The American Review of Public Administration* 49(3), 309–24.
- Meléndez, Edwin and Lisa J. Servon. 2007. Reassessing the Role of Housing in Community-Based Urban Development. *Housing Policy Debate* 18(4), 751–83.
- Mileti, Dennis S. 1999. *Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States*. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press.
- Office of Management and Budget. 2020) Statement of Administration Policy. 5 February. Accessed 31 August 2020. <[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SAP\\_HR-5687.pdf/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SAP_HR-5687.pdf/)>.
- Peacock, Walter Gillis, Betty Hearn Morrow and Hugh Gladwin. 1997. *Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of Disasters*. New York: Routledge.

- Puerto Rico Department of Housing. 2018. Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery Action Plan, approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on 29 July 2018. Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://www.cdbg-dr.pr.gov/en/action-plan/>>.
- Rosselló, Ricardo. 2020. Build Back Better. Puerto Rico. Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery. 13 November 2017. Accessed 31 August 2020. <[https://media.noticel.com/o2com-noti-media-us-east-1/document\\_dev/2017/11/13/Build%20back%20better%20Puerto%20Rico\\_1510595877623\\_9313474\\_ver1.0.pdf/](https://media.noticel.com/o2com-noti-media-us-east-1/document_dev/2017/11/13/Build%20back%20better%20Puerto%20Rico_1510595877623_9313474_ver1.0.pdf/)>.
- Ramos-Bermúdez, Rolando. 2003. Las primeras historias Exitosas de los CH-DOs en Puerto Rico. Fundacion Comunitaria de Puerto Rico. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Recovery Tracker, Funds by Department of Housing and Urban Development, San Juan, P.R. *ProPublica*. Accessed 10 March 2020. <<https://projects.propublica.org/recovery/locale/puerto-rico/san-juan/dept/8600/>>.
- Red de Fundaciones de Puerto Rico. 2019. Philanthropy and Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria: How a Natural Disaster Put Puerto Rico on the Philanthropic Map and Implications for the Future. 1 March. Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/hurricane-relief-put-puerto-rico-on-philanthropic-map-study-finds/>>.
- Robinson, Scott and E. Haley Murphy. 2014. Frontiers for the Study of Nonprofit Organizations in Disasters. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy* 4(2), 128–34.
- Severino, Kathya. 2018. Rebuild Puerto Rico: A Guide to Federal Policy and Advocacy. New York: Center for Puerto Rican Studies. <[https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/data\\_briefs/CENTRO\\_POLICYGUIDE\\_PB2018-02.pdf/](https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/data_briefs/CENTRO_POLICYGUIDE_PB2018-02.pdf/)>.
- Social Enterprise. 2020. What is Social Enterprise? Accessed 31 August 2020. <<https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/>>.
- Stagner, Matthew W. and M. Ángela Durán. 1997. Comprehensive Community Initiatives: Principles, Practice, and Lessons Learned. *The Future of Children* 7(2), 132–40.
- Smith, Gavin P. and Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable Disaster Recovery: Operationalizing An Existing Agenda. In *Handbook of Disaster Research*, eds. Havidan Rodríguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell Dynes. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Smith, Gavin and Thomas Birkland. 2012. Building a Theory of Recovery: Institutional Dimensions. *Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 30(2), 147–70.
- Sviridoff, Mitchell, ed. 2004. Inventing Community Renewal: The Trials and Errors that Shaped the Modern Community. New York: Community Development Research Center, Milano Graduate School, New School University.
- Torres-Cordero, Ariam L. 2020. What is possible? Disaster Policy Options for Long-term Recovery in Puerto Rico. *CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies* 32(3), 199–223.
- Welsh, Mark G. and Ann-Margaret Esnard. 2009. Closing Gaps in Local Housing Recovery Planning for Disadvantaged Displaced Households. *Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research* 11(2), 195–212.